

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

April 19, 2018  
3.2

**TO:** The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

**FROM:** Chief of Police

**SUBJECT:** OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 047-17

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 047-17. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on April 2, 2018. In this case, the recommended findings were not unanimous with a minority opinion rendered regarding the Tactics finding for Officers [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED].

I have carefully weighed each opinion, considered the case in its entirety and adopted the recommendations of the majority opinion. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

**SUMMARY**

On June 19, 2017, at approximately 2300 hours, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Van Nuys Patrol Division, were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white police vehicle, when they received a radio call of a *Battery Domestic Violence Suspect* at [REDACTED] Matilija Avenue. The comments of the call stated the *suspect is the husband, male White, 76 years old, no shirt, 390*. The officers acknowledged the call and began their response.

At approximately 2307 hours, Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Van Nuys Patrol Division, advised Communications Division (CD) they would be backing Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

According to Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], upon arrival, they met with the Person Reporting (PR), later identified as [REDACTED] who advised them that [REDACTED] had been *strangled and assaulted* by [REDACTED] M. Haukka. [REDACTED] also advised them that there were no dogs or weapons in the residence and that Haukka was located in the rear bedroom.

**Note:** Due to the nature of the crime, the victim is referred to by first name and last initial to maintain confidentiality.

[REDACTED]

According to Officer [REDACTED], during [REDACTED] initial assessment, [REDACTED] observed *multiple marks* on the victim and determined they had a *felony domestic crime*. [REDACTED] then waited with [REDACTED] partner for the additional unit to arrive.

According to Officer [REDACTED], upon the arrival of Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] briefed them on the incident and advised them that Haukka was still inside residence and *in the back-left bedroom of the location*.

According to Officer [REDACTED], they formulated a plan to have Officer [REDACTED] give a *call out* command to Haukka. If the *suspect failed to come out of the location*, they would enter the location and apprehend a *felony suspect*. [REDACTED] was also directed to a safe area near the front sidewalk of the residence (Debriefing Point No. 1).

They stood at the front door of the residence and drew their service pistols due to the nature of the incident, and because Haukka was a *felony suspect who could be armed*. Officer [REDACTED] then ordered Haukka to come out of the residence, but Haukka failed to comply, so the officers made entry into the residence (Drawing/Exhibiting).

According to Officer [REDACTED], as they were clearing the residence, he *heard movement in the back bedroom*. [REDACTED] then gave another announcement to Haukka to *come out with his hands up*, but he did not comply. [REDACTED] continued to listen and heard noises consistent with *someone leaving or trying to escape the location*.

According to Officer [REDACTED], during the search, [REDACTED] began *hearing noises along the south side of the house*. They finished their search *of the location and advised the other officers that he was going to go check on the victim who was sitting on the porch*. [REDACTED] then exited the residence and made contact with [REDACTED] who advised [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was *okay* and had *not seen anyone come out of the location*.

According to Officer [REDACTED] was *still hearing noises near the south side of the location*. [REDACTED] then *began to check the southern area* and as [REDACTED] walked east between [REDACTED] residence and [REDACTED] Matilija Avenue, [REDACTED] observed a *wood fence with several pieces of wood either knocked down or missing*. The fence was *slightly leaning over* and as [REDACTED] continued towards the fence, [REDACTED] observed a *footprint on the concrete* of the house next door (Debriefing Point No. 2).

According to Officer [REDACTED] *continued to hear noises south of [REDACTED] location, backed up towards the sidewalk*. As [REDACTED] did so, [REDACTED] looked south and observed Haukka *straddling a picket fence with his hands down near his waist*, wearing only *boxer shorts with no shirt on*.

According to Officer [REDACTED] then loudly ordered Haukka to *show his hands*, because [REDACTED] *knew [REDACTED] partners were nearby and would respond to his location*.

According to Officer [REDACTED], once [REDACTED] partner *went outside*, [REDACTED] *heard him yell that he saw the suspect*. [REDACTED] then *redeployed to the front* and ran south, while holding [REDACTED] pistol down at [REDACTED] side.

█ observed Haukka *attempting to jump the white picket fence on the south side* (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Running with a Service Pistol Drawn).

According to Officer █, Haukka *jumped over that fence* and was now in the *driveway of █ Matilija*. Haukka *tried to jump over the gate* at the end of the driveway. As █ observed Haukka fail to *jump over*, █ and █ partners *deployed by the vehicle that was in the driveway*.

According to Officer █ was *at the start of the driveway* as Haukka *moved west towards a chain link fence*. █ repeatedly ordered Haukka to *show his hands*, simultaneously moving towards Haukka along the driver's side of the parked vehicle. As █ continued *two or three steps in front of the car*, Haukka turned around and he was able to observe a knife in his *right hand*.

According to Officer █ then ordered Haukka to *drop the knife* from approximately 30 feet. █ announced to █ partners to *get a beanbag* as Haukka began *moving east toward him, closing the distance quickly*. █ then started *backpedaling and realized that █ was going uphill and was going to fall over* (Debriefing Point No. 3 and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Simultaneous Commands).

According to Officer █, as Officer █ positioned █ on the driver side of the parked vehicle, █ assumed a position between the passenger side of the vehicle and the picket fence. Haukka was *unable to jump over the gate* and as he *came down the fence*, █ *could see that Haukka was holding a six to eight-inch knife in his right hand*.

According to Officer █, as Haukka began to close the distance with the knife *down by his side*, █ ordered him to *drop the knife* multiple times, but Haukka did not comply (Debriefing Point No. 3 and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Simultaneous Commands).

According to Officer █, Haukka had the knife *over his shoulder above his head*, as he continued to quickly *close the distance*. █ again ordered Haukka to *drop the knife* and added, *if you continue forward I will shoot you*. Haukka continued toward █ and stated *shoot me, shoot me*.

According to Officer █ was behind Officer █ and observed that Officers █ and █ both had their service pistols drawn. █ holstered █ service pistol and transitioned to █ TASER. As Haukka began *advancing towards Officer █* while holding the knife in an *overhand threatening manner*, █ announced, *TASER up*.

According to Officer █ heard one of the officers advise that they had the *TASER out*. As Haukka came within five to seven feet of █ yelled, *deploy the TASER, Tase him now*.

According to Officer █, Haukka got to within *five feet* of Officer █ while holding the knife. Fearing for █ *partner's life*, █ fired one round at Haukka to stop the deadly threat (Lethal Use of Force).

According to Officer [REDACTED] stated, *I will tase you*, as Haukka was *advancing* towards Officer [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] then heard Haukka shout, *shoot me*. Believing Haukka *had the present ability to cause harm to Officer [REDACTED]* deployed the TASER, striking Haukka in the front torso to stop his actions (Less-Lethal Use of Force).

**Note:** According to Officer [REDACTED] TASER activation and Officer [REDACTED] shot were simultaneous, and [REDACTED] believed that the *pop* sound [REDACTED] heard was [REDACTED] TASER being deployed.

According to Officer [REDACTED], Haukka fell face down, and the knife came to rest *one or two feet away from his reach*. [REDACTED] then stepped on the blade of the knife, so that Haukka could not *regain control of the knife*. Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then approached Haukka and took him into custody without further incident. [REDACTED] then broadcast a help call, advising CD that shots had been fired, and requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Haukka.

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel responded and transported Haukka to the University of California Los Angeles, Ronald Regan Medical Center where he was treated for a gunshot wound to his torso.

Sergeant [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED] Van Nuys Patrol Division, responded, assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC) and established a Command Post (CP).

Sergeants [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Van Nuys Patrol Division, and [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED] North Hollywood Patrol Division, responded and ensured the involved officers were separated and monitored. Sergeant [REDACTED] obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer [REDACTED] and Sergeant [REDACTED] obtained a PSS from Officer [REDACTED].

### FINDINGS

**Tactics** – Tactical Debrief, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

**Drawing/Exhibiting** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED].

**Less-Lethal Use of Force** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer [REDACTED].

**Lethal Use of Force** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer [REDACTED].

### ANALYSIS<sup>2</sup>

#### **Detention**

The officers received a Domestic Violence radio call. Upon their arrival, they met with the

[REDACTED]

victim and observed her to have injuries alleged to be from the suspect. Officers determined that a felony crime had occurred and searched the residence to arrest the suspect. As Officers attempted to detain the suspect he approached them armed with a knife. Officers used lethal force to stop his actions and took him into custody. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

### **Tactics**

*Department policy relative to Tactical Debriefs is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance"*

*Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

### Tactical De-Escalation

*Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, the Domestic Violence suspect fled as officers conducted a search of the residence. The officers observed the suspect jump over a neighbor's fence in an attempt to flee. The suspect ignored numerous commands from the officers and approached them while armed with a knife.

The officers did attempt to de-escalate during the very brief opportunity they had to do so. Officer [REDACTED] commanded Haukka to show his hands and then later to drop the knife. They had four officers present at scene and were each equipped with TASERS. Once the suspect produced the knife and closed the distance, [REDACTED] was able to give a last second warning to Haukka that he was going to "tase" him. The situation quickly escalated when the suspect

continued to advance upon the officers and it was no longer safe to continue with further de-escalation efforts.

Faced with an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death, the officer utilized lethal force to stop the deadly threat.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

### **Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Communication/Planning**

*Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training Learning, Domain No. 22).*

*Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).*

Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not effectively communicate with one another on multiple occasions during the incident.

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this case, officers formulated a tactical plan to conduct a protective sweep of the residence, but did not identify their specific roles, such as less lethal or lethal, and also did not designate a communications officer, in the event they encountered the suspect.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] actions were not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training. However, in an effort to enhance future performance under similar circumstance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

### **Debriefing Point No. 2 Separation**

*Separation (Split Up): Separation occurs whenever the distance between the two officers is so great that one cannot render aid to the other when confronted by the suspect or barriers exist that would unreasonably delay the partner officer from being able to render aid. (Los*

*Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013)*

While conducting a search of the residence, Officer [REDACTED] heard noise outside the residence and exited the home to check on victim.

The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution.

In this case, after exiting the residence to check on the victim, Officer [REDACTED] made the decision to check for the suspect on the side yard of the residence, which caused [REDACTED] to lose line of sight Officer [REDACTED], but remained in close proximity to be heard by other officers. After observing the suspect attempting to flee, he ordered the suspect to *show his hands*, from the edge of the property and *waited for assistance*.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that although identified as an area for improvement, Officer [REDACTED] actions were reasonable and not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

### **Debriefing Point No. 3 Utilization of Cover**

*Cover is defined as any object that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to seek cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding areas can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop certain rounds (handgun, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department Basic Firearms Manual, January 2014).*

*Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXV, Issue 9 May 2003).*

The utilization of cover enables an officer to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer's tactical options.

In this case, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attempted to use the vehicle as a barrier between themselves and the suspect when they positioned themselves along the sides of the vehicle and were limited in their ability to redeploy. This position resulted in the officers being at a tactical disadvantage when the suspect turned around holding a knife.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that although identified as an area for improvement, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]'s

actions were reasonable and not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

### **Additional Tactical Debrief Topics**

**Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands** – The investigation revealed that Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] gave simultaneous commands to the suspect during the incident. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Running with a Service Pistol Drawn** – The investigation revealed that Officer [REDACTED] ran out of the residence to assist his partner with his service pistol drawn. Officers [REDACTED] is reminded there is a heightened concern for an unintentional discharge when running with a drawn service pistol. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

### **Command and Control**

Sergeant [REDACTED] responded to scene, assumed the role of IC and established a Command Post (CP).

Sergeants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] responded and ensured the involved officers were separated and monitored. Sergeant Cole obtained a PSS from Officer [REDACTED] and Sergeant [REDACTED] obtained a PSS from Officer [REDACTED].

The actions of these supervisors were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

### **Tactical Debrief**

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made and a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

**Note:** Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;



- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

### General Training Update (GTU)

On June 29, 2017, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered, including Edged Weapons, and Force Option Simulator.

### Drawing/Exhibiting

*Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: "An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.80).*

According to Officer [REDACTED] drew [REDACTED] service pistol prior to conducting a search of the residence because he was aware that a violent crime has occurred and the suspect could arm himself.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*I confirmed that we had a felony domestic violence crime that occurred. I initially unholstered my firearm prior to doing a protective sweep of the house because I know that suspects can arm themselves with weapons and I would be able to protect myself and my partners.*

According to Officer [REDACTED], upon [REDACTED] arrival, [REDACTED] was briefed on the plan to conduct a search of a residence for a felony domestic violence suspect. [REDACTED] drew [REDACTED] service pistol to apprehend a felony suspect inside a residence where knives could be found.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*But prior to making entry, I unholstered my weapon and held it, finger along the frame, at a low-ready because we were entering a location where we knew there was - - we were trying to apprehend a felony suspect. And we did know that there were at least - - at least knives.*

According to Officer [REDACTED], they formulated a plan to conduct a search of the residence for a domestic violence suspect and drew [REDACTED] service pistol because [REDACTED] believed the suspect could arm himself.

[REDACTED]

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*And we unholstered our weapon because we had reason to believe that the situation we were involved in could escalate to the use of deadly force.█*

*There's a kitchen in the house and kitchens have knives. So the suspect might have armed himself in - - in the moment of desperation.█*

*So based on those reasons, that's why I believe that the suspect might have armed himself with - - with a knife or - - or a baseball bat or even a firearm at that point█*

According to Officer [REDACTED] drew [REDACTED] service pistol because they were conducting a search of a residence for a domestic violence suspect who could have armed himself with a weapon.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*Because we had a - - we had a felony suspect inside and reasonably believed that he could have a weapon on him such as like a knife from the kitchen or any type of weapon that he may have had hidden from his wife that his wife didn't know about.█*

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

### **Less-Lethal Use of Force**

*It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:*

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

[REDACTED]

*The TASER may be used on suspects who are violent, or who pose an immediate threat to themselves or others, when an officer believes:*

- *Attempts to subdue the suspect with other tactics have been, or will likely be, ineffective in the situation; or*
- *It will be unsafe for officers to approach within contact range of the suspect. Verbal threats of violence by a suspect do not alone justify the use of the TASER. Any threat must be a credible one.*

*The optimal range for the X-26 TASER with the 21-foot cartridge is 7-15 feet. This range gives the most effective spread of the probes to accomplish neuro-muscular incapacitation.*

*Verbal threats of violence by a suspect do not alone justify the use of the TASER. Any threat must be a credible one (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 4.4, Electronic Control Device TASER –December 2015).*

**Officer [REDACTED]** – One five second TASER activation, in probe mode, from an approximate distance of 10 feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Haukka advancing towards Officer [REDACTED], while holding a knife over his right shoulder, shouting *shoot me* and discharged the TASER to stop Haukka's actions.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*At that point, Officer [REDACTED] continued to give commands to the suspect. The suspect began advancing towards Officer [REDACTED] while holding a knife in an overhand manner with the blade facing down and his shoulder about - - with his hand kind of in a threatening manner right above the shoulder, his right shoulder.*

*And he began advancing in a fast pace. I would say even running. Prior to that, and once I observed Officer [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] with their weapons out, and given that we didn't have a beanbag shotgun with us, I holstered my weapon and I decided to go with the Taser, and I announced, "Taser up."*

*That's when the suspect began advancing at a fast pace again with his - - with his right hand holding what appeared to be a kitchen knife right above his right shoulder. And he kept advancing. And I heard him say at least once, "Shoot me, shoot me," as he began advancing at a fast pace towards Officer [REDACTED]. In my mind, I believe that he had the present ability to cause harm to Officer [REDACTED] at which point, I deployed my Taser. █*

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer [REDACTED], while faced with similar circumstances,

\_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED]

would believe that this same application of less-lethal force would be reasonable to overcome Haukka's resistance.

Therefore, I find Officer [REDACTED] Less-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

### Lethal Use of Force

*Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:*

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Officer [REDACTED] – .45 caliber, one round in a southwesterly direction from an approximate distance of nine feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED], Haukka began to close the distance between him and Officer [REDACTED] while holding a knife in a raised manner. [REDACTED] believed Haukka was going to attack Officer [REDACTED] with the knife and fired one round at Haukka to stop his actions.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

*The knife to his side. And when he began to continue to close the gap, he was approximately five feet away, and that's when he had it out to his side in a raised manner [REDACTED]*

*After numerous demands, he became - - he got as close approximately five feet to my partner. And at that time, I was scared for my partner's life and safety, that he would be cut or killed. And at that point, I shot one round in a southwest direction at the suspect. I felt like my - - my partner's life was in jeopardy, imminent - - imminent jeopardy. [REDACTED]*

*I was continuing to say, "Drop the knife." And then when he got in a place where I felt my partner's safety was in jeopardy from being attacked with a knife, that's when I fired one round [REDACTED]*

[REDACTED]

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer [REDACTED], would reasonably believe Haukka's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer [REDACTED] Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

**Audio/Video Recordings**

**Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)** – Van Nuys Patrol Division vehicles were not equipped with DICVS at the time of the OIS.

**Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Van Nuys Patrol Division personnel were not equipped with BWV at the time of the OIS.

**Outside Video/Photographs** – Witness [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] cellular telephone to capture two separate images. The investigation revealed the images to be of poor quality and of no value to the investigation.

Respectfully,



CHARLIE BECK  
Chief of Police

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

4-19-18